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Should the Law Convict Those Who Act from Conviction? Reflections on a
Demands-of-Conscience Criminal Defense‡
David Lefkowitz, University of Richmond
How should the judge or jury in a just criminal court treat a civil disobedient,
someone who performs a conscientiously motivated communicative breach of the
criminal law? In her excellent new book Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil
Disobedience, Kimberley Brownlee boldly contends that all else equal a court of law
should neither convict nor punish such offenders.1 Rather, people who perform
conscientiously motivated communicative acts of disobedience to law ought to enjoy
what she labels a demands-of-conviction excusatory defense for their criminal
conduct.2 Though I agree with Brownlee that all else equal civil disobedients ought
to be fully exculpated for their criminal conduct, I believe she mischaracterizes the
nature of the criminal defense to which they are entitled. Whereas Brownlee
maintains that such actors ought to be excused for their criminal breach, I argue that
they ought to enjoy a justification defense. Acts of civil disobedience are not
(morally) wrongful violations of the law for which an actor ought not to be blamed,
as Brownlee would have it. They are violations of the law that are not (morally)
wrong in virtue of their illegality. It is the absence of wrongdoing, and not merely
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Published in Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (2016): 657-675.
Brownlee (2012).
2 Brownlee distinguishes between conscientious conviction and conscience, with the former
describing a serious and sincere, though possibly mistaken, belief in a moral norm and the latter
referring to “a set of practical moral skills that stem from an inward knowledge of the working of our
own mind and heart” Brownlee (2012: 52). Since Brownlee’s nomenclature is not widespread, I have
used the phrase ‘demands of conscience’ in this paper’s title. Henceforth, however, I follow Brownlee
in using the phrase ‘demands-of-conviction’ to refer to a criminal defense for those who are
motivated to violate the law by a conscientiously held conviction.
1

the absence of fault, that renders the conviction and punishment of those who
perform acts of civil disobedience inappropriate.
On its face this criticism of Brownlee’s project may seem disappointingly
small. However, the difference between being justified in one’s conduct and merely
being excused for it is one Brownlee herself acknowledges to be of great importance
to any self-respecting person, and rightly so as I explain below.3 Moreover the
account of legal defenses I offer here allows for a more nuanced account than does
Brownlee’s of the ways in which a person may point to her conscientious
convictions to defend her norm-violating conduct. As I explain below, for example,
it reveals the partial truth in both Brownlee’s and Jeremy Horder’s opposing views
on the availability to civil disobedients of a demands-of-conviction excusatory
defense. Consider, too, that the plausibility of an argument for a new criminal
defense such as the one Brownlee defends likely depends to a considerable extent
on how well it coheres with, or follows from, our best understanding of criminal
defenses in general. To the extent that recasting a demands-of-conviction defense
as a justification rather than an excuse advances this end, it serves to buttress the
case for its legal recognition. Finally, consideration of a novel criminal defense
provides an opportunity to revisit, reconceive, and perhaps rationally reconstruct
those defenses already recognized in a particular jurisdiction (or in many
jurisdictions). Even those unconcerned with conscientiously motivated
disobedience to law, then, may have reason to pay careful attention to the
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conclusions drawn by those like Brownlee and me whose analysis of criminal
defenses is motivated by such a concern.
I begin in section I with a brief description of Brownlee’s account of
conscientious conviction, civil disobedience, and the moral right to conscientious
action. In section II I offer an analysis of the nature of justificatory and excusatory
legal defenses. Justificatory legal defenses establish that an agent did no wrong in
virtue of performing a criminally proscribed act as such by demonstrating to the
law’s satisfaction that the particular criminal law the defendant breached lacked
legitimate authority over her in the context in which she violated it. Drawing on
Joseph Raz’s account of the conditions under which law enjoys legitimate authority,
I argue that justificatory legal defenses involve the state’s recognition either that
defendants are more likely to act on an undefeated reason by acting on their own
judgment than by deferring to the law, or that within certain limits it is more
important in cases like the one in question that people act on their own judgment
regarding what they ought to do than that they get it right. Contrary to what I take
Brownlee’s position to be, justificatory legal defenses do not establish that the
defendant’s conduct was justified all things considered, only that it was not
unjustified in virtue of being a violation of the law. As for legal excuses, I follow John
Gardner, on whose analysis of justifications and excuses Brownlee also draws, in
characterizing them narrowly as wrongful violations of the law for which the state
ought not to fault defendants on the grounds that they lived up to our reasonable or
justifiable expectations of them. I contend that the reasonable expectations in
question concern certain errors or malfunctions in practical reasoning for which we
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ought not to hold agents responsible. Construed in this narrow manner, legal
excuses constitute concessions the law makes to human frailty or imperfection.
Brownlee’s analysis of (legal) excuses is importantly incomplete, I argue; while she
rightly notes that paradigmatically excuses involve a claim to be justified in
believing, albeit mistakenly, that one was justified in acting as one did, she fails to
engage sufficiently with the questions of what can justify a person in holding that
mistaken belief and why that justification renders conviction and punishment
inappropriate.
In section III I employ the analyses of justificatory and excusatory legal
defenses sketched above to demonstrate that Brownlee’s own arguments for a
demands-of-conviction defense actually support its construal as a justification, not
the excuse she seeks to defend. Specifically, I contend that the value of personal
autonomy and psychological health to which Brownlee appeals grounds a moral
right to conscientious action, or perhaps better, partly characterizes the principle of
humanism that Brownlee identifies as the basis for such a right. Moreover, the value
of autonomy and psychological health is not the sort of consideration that can
excuse wrongful conduct, though distortions of one’s practical reasoning caused by
fear or anger in response to threats to one’s autonomy or psychological health might
be. I briefly explore this last possibility in section IV, where I argue that civil
disobedients may sometimes have an excuse for breaches of the criminal law that
fall outside the scope of their right to conscientious action and for which they are
therefore not entitled to a justificatory legal defense. I also examine the
aforementioned dispute between Brownlee and Horder regarding the justifiability
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of extending an excusatory legal defense to civil disobedients, and argue that while
Brownlee correctly concludes that such actors have a prima facie claim to a criminal
defense, Horder is largely right when he argues that they ought not to be excused.
Before I turn to the tasks outlined above, I note two important limits on the
scope of the discussion. First, as I have indicated several times already, both
Brownlee and I take our arguments to establish only prima facie or defeasible claims
to a justificatory or excusatory demands-of-conviction defense. We aim to establish
what sort of treatment civil disobedients deserve; that is, how a criminal court ought
to treat them insofar as it aims to respond to them as responsible agents. Other
moral considerations may sometimes justify the state’s failure to give defendants
what they deserve, however. For example, justifiable concerns regarding its abuse
may warrant a demands-of-conviction justificatory defense with a far narrower
scope than the moral right to conscientious action it serves to institutionalize.4
Additionally, the need to strike a balance between individuals’ interest in
conscientious action and individuals’ interest in a stable and effective state that
renders them secure in their moral rights may justify the state’s imposing certain
burdens on those who perform acts of civil disobedience even where, taken in
isolation, such conduct does not merit conviction or punishment.5 Thus an analysis
of the treatment conscientiously motivated law-breakers deserve is unlikely to be a

For illuminating discussion of this point, see Horder (2004: 15-20); see also Brownlee (2012: 2502).
5 Brownlee and I dispute how best to understand this argument. See Brownlee (2012: 240-8) for
criticisms of my argument that the moral right to civil disobedience protects those who perform such
acts from punishment but not from penalties; Lefkowitz (2007: 218-23). In Lefkowitz (2012) I offer
a preliminary response to those criticisms, but space does not permit me to address them further
here.
4

5

complete account of how a just state ought to treat them. The second, and related,
limit on my investigation concerns its almost exclusive focus on the trial stage of the
law’s response to conscientiously motivated breaches of the criminal law. That
hardly exhausts the domains in which we ought to consider how a just state should
respond to such acts. For example, we should consider whether conscientiously
motivated disobedience to a particular law, even when it is neither justified nor
excused, constitutes a less serious wrong than does non-conscientiously motivated
disobedience to the same law. If so, and if punishment ought to be proportionate to
the moral seriousness of the wrong, then at least some conscientiously motivated
law-breakers might merit lesser sentences than “normal” offenders. This question
concerns the sentencing phase, and there are others that concern policing and
decisions to prosecute conscientiously motivated violations of the law.6 One can
only do so much in a single paper, however; therefore I set aside the issues
identified in this paragraph to focus on desert-based arguments for a demands-ofconviction criminal defense.
I
Brownlee characterizes a person with a conscientious moral conviction as
someone with a sincere and serious, though possibly mistaken, moral commitment.
She spells out the sincerity and seriousness that are the mark of a conscientiously
held conviction in terms of four conditions that together comprise the
communicative principle of conscientiousness.7 A person with a conscientiously

6
7

See, e.g., Smith (2012).
Brownlee (2012: 29-47).
6

held conviction exhibits, as best she can, consistency between her moral judgment,
her actions, and her attitude toward herself and others. Her moral judgment applies
universally; that is, to all relevantly similar agents in all relevantly similar
circumstances. She does not seek to evade the consequences of fidelity to her moral
conviction for the sake of personal protection, i.e. simply because doing so will
better advance her self-interest than will non-evasion. Finally, all else equal a fully
conscientious actor is willing to defend her moral conviction in a reasoned dialogue
with others. Together with the non-evasion condition, this last, communicative,
condition for the possession of a conscientious moral conviction sometimes entails
the necessity of actively challenging existing social practices, including the law and
public policy, as part of an effort to engage others in a dialogue regarding the justice
of those practices.
Those with conscientious moral convictions, Brownlee maintains, enjoy a
limited moral right to act on them.8 The moral right to conscientious action is
grounded in a principle of humanism, according to which “society has a duty to
honor the fact that we are reasoning and feeling beings capable of forming deep
moral commitments.”9 The limits of the moral right to conscientious action are
drawn by respect for others’ rights, and therefore it does not extend to acts that
“either violate the dignity of others or threaten their basic needs.”10 Though
Brownlee says otherwise, it seems to me that the scope of the right is also
constrained by the requirement that genuinely conscientious action be
Brownlee (2012: 140-51).
Brownlee (2012: 7).
10 Brownlee (2012: 141; 149).
8
9
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communicative in the sense described above. Support for this assertion comes from
a consideration of Brownlee’s characterization of civil disobedience.
Brownlee holds that civil disobedience “must include a deliberate breach of
law taken on the basis of steadfast personal commitment [i.e. a conscientious moral
conviction] in order to communicate with a relevantly placed audience, which is
usually society or the government, our condemnation of a law or set of policies.”11
As an expression of an agent’s conscientious moral convictions, civil disobedience
falls within the scope of the moral right to conscientious action. Because it must be
conscientiously motivated, only those acts that meet certain process-related
constraints that reflect the necessarily communicative nature of conscientious
action qualify as civil disobedience. Brownlee spells out these constraints in terms
of a civilly disobedient actor’s sensitivity to three reasons she has to “not be overly
radical” in the form or method she employs to communicate her conviction.12 First,
certain tactics may distract others’ attention from the conviction she seeks to
express; they may become so focused on what she did that they pay little or no
attention to her reasons for doing it. Second, the civilly disobedient actor’s attempt
to engage others in a dialogue regarding the justice of the law or policy she protests
will likely only succeed if she treats (or is seen to treat) others as interlocutors with
whom she aspires to engage in a rational, or reason-giving, discussion. Finally, civil
disobedients’ awareness of their own fallibility gives them a reason to be and to
display modesty in their violation of social norms, particularly those such as the

11
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Brownlee (2012: 18).
Brownlee (2012: 20).
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laws of a liberal-democratic state that have some claim to epistemic superiority.13
All else equal, any act of disobedience to law that does not reflect (adequate)
sensitivity to these reasons fails to be communicative. It follows that such acts
cannot be expressions of a conscientiously held conviction, and so their
permissibility cannot be established by appeal to a moral right to conscientious
action.14
In section IV I briefly consider one sort of defense that might be offered for
conduct intended to protest the injustice of a law or policy that falls afoul of these
process-related constraints on civil disobedience; what I label failed attempts at civil

The epistemic authority of such norms ought not to be exaggerated, however, as Brownlee rightly
argues.
14 Brownlee contrasts civil disobedience with what she terms personal disobedience: noncommunicative violations of the law motivated by personal conviction that are either evasive or nonevasive. Brownlee rightly points out that, in comparison to the civil disobedient, we have more
reason to doubt the seriousness and sincerity of a law-breaker’s claim to have acted from moral
conviction if she attempts to evade the law’s detection of her criminal conduct and refuses to offer a
reasoned defense of the conviction on which she allegedly acted. At times, though, it seems that
Brownlee makes a stronger claim, namely that actors who do not meet the communicative condition
and perhaps also the non-evasion condition lack a conscientious moral conviction altogether.
Brownlee frequently identifies personal disobedience with what other authors refer to as
conscientious objection, and then claims to reverse the standard liberal view by arguing that civil
disobedients have a stronger claim to accommodation by the state than do personal disobedients. I
think she misrepresents the views of many liberal theorists when she equates their notion of a
conscientious objector with her conception of a personal disobedient. As I read the theoretical
literature on principled disobedience to law (which, admittedly, is far from uniform in how it
characterizes these concepts), what distinguishes civil disobedience from conscientious objection is
not evasion or communication but whether the disobedient actor aims to bring about a change to
existing law or policy or merely seeks to be exempted from it. The “standard liberal view,” then, is
not that actors who non-communicatively violate the law have a stronger claim to accommodation by
the state than do those who do so communicatively. Instead, the claim is that the state should be
more accommodating toward those who simply seek an exemption from a law or policy than it is
towards those who violate the law as part of a political campaign to change it. Even if the arguments
for the “standard liberal view” grounded in democratic authority fail, as Brownlee and I both argue
they do, there may be other reasons that support it. The relative strength of the claim to
accommodation aside, what I take to be the standard liberal distinction between civil disobedience
and conscientious objection leaves room for an argument that the state ought to tolerate
conscientiously motivated disobedience to law even when it is not undertaken for the purpose of
challenging law or policy. Contrary to Brownlee’s assertion (2012: 144-5), then, an argument like my
own that grounds a right to civil disobedience in a more general right to political participation need
not imply that the state has a duty to accommodate conscientious disobedience to law only when
undertaken for a political aim by disempowered minorities.
13
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disobedience. Primarily, however, my concern is with acts of civil disobedience as
Brownlee characterizes them. All else equal, a just state ought to accord those who
perform conscientiously motivated communicative acts of disobedience to law a
demands-of-conviction legal defense, one that I argue contra Brownlee recognizes
their conduct as justified, not excused.
II
Normative defenses are responses to accusations of wrongdoing; i.e. to
accusations that a person has violated a norm that applies to her in virtue of a
certain role she occupies or status she has, such as friend, nurse, moral agent, or
legal subject. They constitute attempts to demonstrate to the accuser (and perhaps
also to third parties) that she does not have the reason(s) she takes herself to have
to blame the accused. Defenses serve this end in at least four distinct ways: an actor
may contest the attribution of the act to her; she may deny that she qualified as a
responsible agent when she “performed” the wrong act (or perhaps better, when the
norm-violating behavior occurred); she may contest the accusation that in acting as
she did she committed the wrong of which she is accused, or she may contest the
(implicit) claim that she merits blame or some other form of censure for the wrong
she committed. The point of the first two defenses is to deny the attribution of the
act or behavior to the accused. If a person did not perform the act in question then
she does not merit blame for having done that act. The point of the second two
defenses is to take responsibility for the act in question, to acknowledge or endorse
its attribution to one as a responsible agent, but to argue either that one has a
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justification for acting as one did or that one ought to be excused for one’s wrongful
action.
Arguably this normative practice of accusation and response is central to
many actual criminal legal systems, and as a matter of justice, ought to be. Criminal
or legal defenses are responses to the state’s accusation of criminal wrongdoing;
that is, to the charge that one has acted wrongly by violating one or more criminal
laws. Many criminal law systems recognize examples of all four types of defense to
an accusation of wrongdoing described above. Since the cases of interest in this
paper are ones in which the defendant does not protest the law’s attribution to her
of a criminal act, i.e. to the performance of a token of the type of act described in a
particular criminal offense definition, I set aside the first two types of defenses and
focus on justifications and excuses. That strategy may strike some as mistaken since
civil disobedients sometimes make remarks that might be interpreted as denying
their status as responsible moral agents. The best known example, of course, is
Martin Luther’s proclamation: “here I stand, I can do no other.” However, I maintain
that these utterances are better interpreted as statements regarding the actions the
civil disobedient takes herself to have undefeated reason to perform. Luther’s claim,
then, is that as a rational agent, one able to respond correctly to the reasons that
apply to him, he cannot act other than he does. Civil disobedients make remarks like
these in order to affirm their rationality, and thereby aim to rebut those who would
take their deviant, norm violating, conduct as evidence to the contrary.15 In

15

See Brownlee (2012: 169) on this point.
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attempting to offer a justification or excuse for her criminal breach the civil
disobedient takes responsibility for it.
Since both justificatory and excusatory legal defenses result in the
defendant’s acquittal, it may seem to be of only academic interest which of the two
the accused may offer in defense of her criminal conduct. Yet as John Gardner notes,
the outcome of a trial in which the defendant is found justified in her criminal
breach is not the same as the outcome of a trial in which she is merely excused for
having performed such an act.16 While the defendant avoids public condemnation
and punishment in both cases, in the former she does so because the state
determines that she did not act wrongly in virtue of disobeying the law; at least in
this respect she did not err or make a mistake in practical reasoning. In contrast, in
a case where the defendant qualifies only for an excuse the state finds that she erred
in not taking the criminal prohibition as an undefeated reason for action, or as
excluding the reason on which she acted, and while it does not fault her for doing so
it nevertheless finds her practical reasoning deficient; that is, it judges her to have
come up short as a rational agent. Gardner rightly emphasizes that we care about
this difference, and Brownlee explicitly concurs.17 In responding to an accusation of
wrongdoing we would rather demonstrate that our conduct was justified than that
it was excused because the latter involves conceding a rational failure, a failure to
act on the reasons on which we ought to have acted. No self-respecting person

Gardner 132-33
Gardner (2007: 133-4). Brownlee writes “… we not only want to assert our basic responsibility if
we take ourselves seriously, but have an interest in asserting it as reasoning beings” and that
“according to this Aristotelian picture, if we can, we give a justificatory explanation for any wrong we
do” (2012: 161).
16
17
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wants to be a failure. This is likely to be especially true of the conscientiously
motivated civil disobedients on whose behalf Brownlee argues for a demands-ofconviction defense. After all, she maintains that a sine qua non of those who disobey
the law on the basis of conscientious moral convictions is that “they be willing to
communicate [their] judgment that a perceived injustice warrants [their]
opposition.”18 Surely people so attuned to (what they perceive to be) the demands
of justice, and so committed to realizing it that they risk the various official and
unofficial sanctions that typically attach to violation of the law, will be the kind of
people to whom it matters a great deal whether they are, and are publicly judged to
be, justified or only excused for their criminal breaches.19 Moreover, it should
matter to us whether conscientiously motivated civil disobedients merit a
justificatory defense or an excuse, since we ought to strive to hold people
responsible only for that for which they are responsible, whether it be doing no
wrong in virtue of performing a criminally prohibited act or only not being at fault
for doing so.
In offering a justificatory defense for her criminal breach, a defendant
concedes that she performed a token of a type of act prohibited by the criminal law
but maintains that she was not wrong to do so. How can that be? If she committed
the criminal offense then how can her act not be wrong? The answer, I submit, is

Brownlee (2012: 160).
This is not to deny that civil disobedients may care more about correcting the perceived injustice
they oppose than their own treatment at the state’s hands. But the fact that on the basis of strategic
considerations a civil disobedient may pursue an excusatory defense rather than a justificatory one
(e.g. couch her defense in terms of blameless wrongdoing rather than in terms of having committed
no wrong) does not entail that she does not care whether others think her criminal breach justifiable
or merely excusable.
18
19
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that justificatory defenses purport to identify cases in which the state lacks
authority vis-à-vis the defendant; that is, cases in which agents do not have a duty to
obey the law. As I will explain, defendants may contest the law’s authority with
respect to their performance of a particular act in one of two ways. Either they may
argue that in cases like the one in question the law does not serve to enhance its
subjects’ conformity to right reason, or they may argue that respect for their
autonomy precludes the state from requiring them to defer to its action-guiding
judgments vis-à-vis the act-type in question. Before turning to the kind of
arguments defendants may offer as legal justifications for their criminal breaches,
however, I want to emphasize the nature of the claim they make. Contrary to
Brownlee (and to Gardner, on whose account of defenses she relies), justificatory
legal defenses need not be all things considered justifications, understood as a
demonstration that one acted for an undefeated reason.20 Rather, justificatory legal
defenses speak only to the reasons for action an agent has qua legal subject. If
successful, what they demonstrate is that an agent did no wrong in virtue of
performing a criminally proscribed act as such. Since the law enjoyed no legitimate
claim to authority over her with respect to the particular act she performed, the
defendant did not act wrongly by failing to defer to the law’s judgment as expressed
by the criminal prohibition on the performance of such acts. Note, however, that a
successful justificatory legal defense does not cancel all of the reasons that count
against the performance of the act the agent performed. Therefore even a successful
justificatory legal defense leaves open the possibility that, in acting as she did, the

20

Brownlee (2012: 162); Gardner (2007: 97).
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agent not only acted wrongly but without an all things considered justification for
her conduct.21
The foregoing analysis of justificatory legal defenses employs the account of
law and legal authority developed by Joseph Raz, one that Brownlee appears to
endorse.22 On that account, law necessarily claims authority over all those within its
jurisdiction. Its claim is justified, or the law enjoys legitimate authority vis-à-vis a
particular subject, only if “the subject would better conform to the reasons that
apply to him anyway (that is, to reasons other than the directives of the authority) if
he intends to be guided by the authority’s directives than if he does not… [and] the
matters regarding which the first condition is met are such that with respect to
them it is better to conform to reason than to decide for oneself, unaided by
authority…”23 Where these conditions are met, the law typically provides its
subjects with protected reasons for action; first order reasons to perform (or not
perform) certain acts together with second-order reasons not to consider certain
other first-order reasons against performing (or not performing) those acts.
Rational actors, by which again I mean ones who are properly responsive to
reasons, ought to act on the basis of such reasons when they apply to them, i.e. when
the law enjoys legitimate authority over them. Where the independent reasons
responsiveness to which the law serves to enhance are moral ones, the rational

The phrasing of this sentence reflects my acceptance arguendo of Brownlee’s and Gardner’s view
that one may be justified in acting wrongly. See Brownlee (2012: 161-2); Gardner (2007: 77-82; 95103).
22 Brownlee (2012: 99-100). Gardner (2007: 104-7) employs this account as well.
23 Raz (2006: 1014).
21
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requirement to defer to the law’s judgment can be characterized as a moral duty to
obey the law.
Justificatory criminal defenses, recall, purport to demonstrate that an agent
did not act wrongly in failing to defer to the law’s judgment that she ought not to
perform the act she did. Given Raz’s account of the conditions for law’s legitimate
authority, one way defendant’s can attempt to justify their criminal conduct is by
demonstrating that in situations like those in which the agent acted the law’s
subjects will generally do better at acting on the “reasons that apply to them
anyway” if they act on their own judgment regarding what they have undefeated
reason to do than if they defer to the law’s judgment. Perhaps the best and probably
the most common way to make a case for this conclusion is to argue that had those
who formulated the law been cognizant of situations like the one in which the
defendant acted, they would have changed their formulation so as not to preclude
the defendant acting as she did for the reasons that she did. While legal officials
may find such arguments most persuasive when they judge the agent in question to
have acted for a reason that was undefeated (apart from the criminal law whose
authoritativeness is at issue), this is not a necessary condition for the success of
such arguments, either in persuading legal officials or on their merits. Rather, all the
defendant need establish is that she (and by extension, other similarly situated
individuals) was in a better position to ascertain what she had reason to do than
was the law.
A second way in which defendants can attempt to legally justify their
criminal conduct is to argue that they had a moral right to act as they did. As Raz’s

16

analysis of the conditions under which law enjoys legitimate authority suggests, in
some cases it may be more important that an agent act on her own judgment than
that she judge correctly, i.e. act for an undefeated reason. Such a claim stands in
need of defense, of course, and I argue in the next section that Brownlee offers a
compelling one, at least for acts of civil disobedience as she characterizes them.
Here, however, I simply assume the justifiability of autonomy-protecting rights so as
to focus on the form of the defendant’s justificatory argument. In asserting in a
court of law that she has a moral right to perform the particular law-violating act
she performed, a defendant makes her case not on the merits of her conduct but by
challenging the law’s normative jurisdiction over her; i.e. the justifiability of its claim
to authority over her vis-à-vis the particular act she performed. In evaluating her
argument, and so considering whether to grant her a justificatory legal defense, the
court need not and perhaps should not consider whether her conduct was justified
all things considered (i.e. whether she acted for an undefeated reason). Rather, it
should ask whether the defendant actually enjoys the right she claims, and if so,
whether her conduct fell within the scope of that right. Affirmative answers to these
two questions provide a defeasible justification for her criminal conduct, a
defeasible claim to have done nothing wrong merely in virtue of having chosen to do
what was criminally prohibited. The justification is only defeasible because, as I
noted in the introduction to this essay, considerations such as those related to the
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institutionalizing of such a defense may entail that all things considered the law may
justifiably refuse to recognize the right in question by granting a legal defense.24
Justificatory legal defenses, then, are not complete rational justifications for
criminal conduct; that is, they do not show that the defendant acted for an
undefeated reason. Rather, legal justifications provide what Gardner labels
cancelling permissions.25 In granting a justificatory legal defense, the law cancels a
reason the defendant would otherwise have not to perform a particular act (for
certain reasons), namely that she has a legal duty not to do so. In doing so, the state
renders it permissible for its subjects to perform particular criminal acts for
particular reasons, though it does not provide them with a reason to do so. While
this description may suggest otherwise, the court does not make an act justified
after the fact (except, perhaps, in the first instance in which a defense is granted, in
which case the court makes or modifies the law, rather than applying or interpreting
it); rather, the law considers whether the agent had a legal justificatory defense for
his criminal conduct at the time he performed the act in question.
Whereas defendants who offer a justificatory legal defense for their criminal
conduct maintain that they did no wrong in failing to treat as authoritative a

Brownlee (2012: 123-4) notes that it would be paradoxical for the law to recognize the moral right
to civil disobedience, i.e. to conscientious communicative disobedience to the law, by translating it
into a legal right. After all, were there a legal right to deliberately break the law in order to
communicate one’s conscientious convictions, such acts would not actually count as illegal. The
foregoing analysis of justificatory legal defenses shows how the law may recognize a moral right to
conscientious action that includes civil disobedience without generating this paradox. Acts for which
a person enjoys a justificatory legal defense are illegal; that is, they are tokens of an act type
proscribed by a criminal offense definition. But they are not wrongful because the criminal norm in
question is not authoritative vis-à-vis the actor in question in the circumstances in which she acted.
As I argue below, in the case of civil disobedience the explanation for the norm’s lack of authority lies
in the actor’s moral right to conscientious action.
24

25

Gardner (2007: 106-7).
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particular criminal prohibition, those who offer a legal excuse concede that they
ought to have recognized the criminal law’s authority but argue that they should not
be blamed or faulted for their failure to do so. More precisely, those who offer a
legal excuse admit to an error in practical reasoning, a failure either to advert to all
and only those reasons that applied to them, or to properly integrate the protected
reason provided by a particular criminal norm into their deliberation. I focus here
on shortcomings in integration.26 Reasons are properly integrated into an agent’s
deliberation when they function correctly, defeating (outweighing) or excluding all
and only the other reasons that they do, in fact, defeat or exclude. Failures of
integration occur when reasons do not function correctly in an agent’s deliberation;
for example, when an agent does not take a reason to exclude or defeat some other
reason that it does, in fact, exclude or defeat. In slightly less jargon-filled terms,
defendants who seek an excusatory defense concede that the law provided them
with a reason not to perform the act they did, at least for the reasons that moved
them to perform it, and that they erred in failing to respond properly to that reason.
Nevertheless they contend that their error was reasonable, where that means that in
reasoning as they did they lived up to our justifiable normative expectations of
them.
So defined, the category of legal excuse encompasses a far smaller class of
arguments than often fall under that heading in criminal law textbooks or in certain
philosophical accounts of legal excuse. Construed narrowly, as I follow Gardner in

R.A. Duff (2007: 263-98) distinguishes faultless failures to advert to reasons that apply to one,
which he labels unjustified but warranted, from faultless failures of deliberation, which he labels
excuses. Gardner (2007: 86-7) groups both types of shortcomings under the heading of excuses.
26
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doing here, excuses are distinct from denials of responsibility (i.e. arguments that
deny a defendant’s status as a responsible agent, such as the insanity defense) and
failures of proof (i.e. arguments that deny the attribution to the defendant of the act
specified in the criminal offense definition, as in some mistake of fact defenses). In
presenting Gardner’s account of defenses, on the basis of which she argues for a
demands-of-conviction excusatory defense, Brownlee focuses on Gardner’s claim
that “the paradigm excuse is that one had a justified belief in justification” though
one did not, in fact, have a justification for acting as one did.27 In a legal context, at
least, this claim sweeps too broadly, since it fails to distinguish excuses from failures
of proof. While both involve a defendant’s claim to have been justified in forming
and acting on what was actually a false belief, failure of proof arguments do so in
order to contest the attribution of norm-violating conduct to the agent, while
excuses do so in order to contest the claim that the agent was at fault for her
violation of the norm. A better starting point for an analysis of legal excuses
(narrowly construed) is with Gardner’s statement in an eponymous article that “the
gist of an excuse… is precisely that the person with the excuse lived up to our
[normative] expectations.”28 To offer a complete excuse for one’s criminal conduct,
say by arguing that one acted under duress or that one was provoked, is to maintain
that there is an explanation for one’s faulty practical reasoning that shows one to
have met the law’s reasonable or justifiable expectations regarding responsiveness
to reasons that apply to one in the circumstances in which one acted. These last
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qualifications highlight the normative component of the standards against which an
agent’s responsiveness to reasons is measured; for example, we justifiably demand
that police officers display greater fortitude in the face of threats of bodily harm
than we do of ordinary citizens.29 Since a defendant with a complete excuse meets
the law’s reasonable or justifiable expectations of her, it has no desert-based
grounds on which to find her at fault for her violation of the law, let alone for
punishing her, even though she failed to properly integrate the criminal prohibition
on acts of the type she performed into her deliberation. Of course, in the context of
a legal excuse the law’s reasonable expectations of its subjects cannot simply be that
they respond appropriately to the reasons for action with which it provides them.
Rather, with respect to excuses I contend that the law’s reasonable expectations
concern the concessions it makes to human imperfection or frailty, including
(though perhaps not limited to) certain errors or malfunctions in practical
reasoning for which we ought not to hold agents responsible. For example, a
defendant who claims duress as an excuse admits her responsibility for the
commission of the crime, its attribution to her qua rational agent. She acted for a
reason she mistakenly took to be undefeated. What she denies is that she ought to
be held responsible for the fact that her fear of another’s threat led her to
erroneously treat as undefeated the reason on which she acted.
In a legal context, the term ‘excuse’ applies only to cases in which a defendant
can point to a defect in practical reasoning for which she ought not to be held
responsible as a complete defense for her criminal conduct. In non-legal contexts,
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however, the term ‘excuse’ applies as well to partial defenses for norm-violating
conduct. In such cases, we recognize the degree to which a given human
imperfection or frailty made it more difficult for the agent in question to respond
appropriately to the reasons that applied to her. While we do not judge the level of
difficulty to have been so great that we think it unjustifiable to blame her at all for
what she did, neither do we think it justifiable to blame her as much as we would a
person who made the same error in practical reasoning without being subject to the
challenges to reasoning well that she faced. Of course, typically some degree of
difficulty in reasoning well due to particular human imperfections will not excuse at
all. This person to whom the partially excused agent is judged to be comparatively
less blameworthy is not the agent who faces no such difficulty at all (God, perhaps?),
but a person who acts only under “normal” challenges to reasoning well.30
Arguably, in at least some jurisdictions the law sometimes recognizes and responds
to defendants’ partial excuses for their criminal wrongdoing by charging them with
a lesser offense and/or sentencing them to a lesser punishment than it might. In
doing so, legal officials recognize that when conceived of as a blaming response
punishment ought to be doubly proportionate: first to the moral seriousness of the
criminal breach the defendant performed, and second to the extent if any to which

Horder (2004: 8-9) says of excuses that they shine a positive light on wrongdoing. Though it may
be substantively identical, I think it more apt to say that excuses show the performance of a wrongful
act, and so the agent who performed it, in a less negative light; that is, they show her failure to
respond appropriately to reasons to be a lesser shortcoming than it would be had she not been
subject to the human imperfections or frailties that led her to reason poorly.
30
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she ought to be excused for doing so. Strictly speaking, however, partial excuses do
not provide a person accused of a crime with a criminal defense.31
In this section I have sought to characterize the precise nature of the
response to an accusation of criminal wrongdoing a defendant makes when she
offers either a justificatory or excusatory defense for her breach of the criminal law.
Legal justifications purport to demonstrate that the defendant did nothing wrong in
virtue of her violation of the particular criminal prohibition she breached; that is,
she did not act wrongly in failing to treat that prohibition as authoritative, as
providing her with a protected reason for action. Legal excuses, narrowly
construed, purport to demonstrate that the law ought not to fault the defendant for
her failure to properly integrate a particular criminal prohibition into her
deliberation, and so for choosing to act in violation of it. It should not do so because
the defendant met our reasonable expectations for people like her in situations like
the one in which she broke the law, expectations that reflect concessions the law
ought to make to human frailty. With this understanding of justificatory and
excusatory legal defenses in hand, I now consider whether, and when, a just state
ought to recognize such defenses for those who commit conscientiously motivated
acts of disobedience to law.
III

Note that partial excuses are not the only grounds a court may have to mitigate the punishment it
assigns a particular defendant. Rather, partial excuses constitute reasons the law ought to take into
account insofar as it aims to engage with her as a responsible agent, i.e. to give her what she
deserves.
31
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Brownlee maintains that those who perform conscientiously motivated
communicative acts of disobedience to law have a prima facie claim to the state’s
excusing their criminal conduct. Though this may be true in a few cases, I will now
demonstrate that that Brownlee’s arguments actually support a demands-ofconviction justificatory defense, not the excusatory one she explicitly sets out to
defend. Since as self-respecting responsible agents we aim to justify our conduct if
we can and to offer an excuse for it only if we must, this conclusion marks an
important correction to Brownlee’s account of the rejoinder civil disobedients may
give in response to a charge of criminal wrongdoing. Moreover, this correction
creates the conceptual space necessary to argue, contra Browlee, that even when
conscientiously motivated disobedients to law ought to be punished for their
criminal conduct they may still have a prima facie claim to mitigated punishment as
a matter of justice and not merely mercy.
Brownlee argues that both respect for autonomy and sensitivity to the
psychological injuries a person is likely to suffer should she conform to the law at
the cost of betraying her deeply held moral commitments ground a demands-ofconviction defense. Consider, first, the argument from respect for autonomy.
Echoing Horder, Brownlee maintains that were the law to insist that its subjects
always compromise their moral convictions when adherence to them conflicts with
conformity to the law it would unduly affect their prospects for realizing full
personal autonomy.32 The state has a moral duty not to impose such a demand
upon them, one that correlates to their moral right to act in ways expressive of their
32
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conscientious convictions. So, suppose a person trespasses for the purpose of
expressing her conscientious moral conviction that a particular law or policy is
unjust. The argument from autonomy implies that when brought before a court of
law she should offer in her defense not simply the particular conviction that
motivated her illegal act but her right as a “reasoning and feeling being capable of
forming deep moral commitments” to act on her conviction even, within certain
limits, when that involves violating the law. As I argued in the preceding section,
however, to do so is to offer a justificatory defense for her criminal conduct. It is to
meet the law’s accusation of criminal wrongdoing by arguing that she had no duty to
treat the criminal norm she violated as authoritative, or more precisely as not
excluding the performance of conscientiously motivated communicative acts of
disobedience to that law.
Of course, a civil disobedient will almost certainly believe that her criminal
conduct was justified all things considered. That is, she will likely believe that her
illegal act was not wrong all things considered, and not merely that it was not wrong
in virtue of being a violation of the law though wrong for some other reason.33 We
all aspire to act for undefeated reasons, after all, which is just what it means to say
that our conduct is justified all things considered. Given this aspiration, it should
come as no surprise that when civil disobedients defend their criminal conduct,

That someone might make the latter claim may sound odd. Consider, however, the possibility that
in the interval between when she performed the act in question and when she goes to trial for it the
agent may conclude that she ought not to have acted as she did because the moral or prudential
reasons that applied to her left her with no undefeated reason for so acting. I ought not to have done
it, she may concede, but not because it was illegal. Intriguingly, such an agent may have a
justification for her violation of the law, but at most only an excuse for her violation of some other
norm she also breached in acting as she did.
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whether in a court of law, in the media, or in private conversation they oftentimes
attempt to show that it was justified all things considered. At least in a liberal state,
though, the law does not concern itself with whether its subjects act justifiably all
things considered but only with whether they respond properly to the reasons for
action it provides them. So while the civil disobedient may want to vindicate her
violation of the law by showing that it was justified all things considered, all she
need do to respond to a criminal charge is argue that her act was not unjustified
because it was a breach of the criminal law.
Brownlee’s attempt to justify a demands-of-conviction defense for criminal
conduct by appeal to the psychological costs that conformity to the law can impose
also reads better as an argument for a justificatory defense than as an argument for
an excusatory one. She writes that the law’s demand that in cases of conflict fidelity
to it always take priority over loyalty to her moral convictions might well threaten
an agent’s integrity, leave her alienated from the life she lives, and subject to
frequent weakness of the will.34 These setbacks to an agent’s psychological health
are deeply problematic both in their own right and in terms of their contribution to
an agent’s autonomy. With regard to the latter, Brownlee rightly points out that “in
valuing autonomy, it is necessary to value also the conditions for autonomy, one of
which is an integrated mind and the capacity for practical reasoning.”35 If valuing
the conditions for autonomy is part of what is involved in valuing autonomy, and if
properly valuing an agent’s autonomy requires recognizing her right to
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conscientious action, then valuing the conditions for autonomy requires recognizing
a right to conscientious action. As should now be clear, however, a civil disobedient
who employs this chain of reasoning to respond to a criminal charge offers a
justificatory defense of her illegal conduct. In cases where obedience to law
threatens to seriously damage an agent’s ability to act autonomously, it may
sometimes be more important from a moral standpoint that she act on her own
judgment of what she ought to do than that she defer to the law’s judgment, even if
her judgment is mistaken while the law’s is not. If it can do so without unduly
burdening others, i.e. unjustifiably violating or failing to protect their moral rights,
then the state should tolerate conscientiously motivated criminal conduct so as to
refrain from injuring the psychological capacities that are conditions for civil
disobedients’ autonomy.
Brownlee also offers as a reason for the law to acknowledge a demands-ofconviction defense “the psychological importance, distinct from autonomy, of our
not always having to give priority to literal adherence with the law over our own
beliefs and commitments” (Brownlee, 168). I am not entirely clear on what
Brownlee has in mind here, but one plausible basis for this psychological
importance is the phenomenological suffering that normally accompanies the
experience of alienation or weakness of the will. Might a conscientiously motivated
law-breaker offer the suffering she risked were she to have obeyed the law she
breached as an independent basis for a justificatory defense of her criminal
conduct? It depends on whether the interest people have in being free from the
suffering that typically characterizes the aforementioned psychological harms is
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weighty enough to generate a prima facie right against the state that it not impose
upon them the risk of suffering such harms.36 If people have such an interest, then
like the interest in autonomy it can serve to define a domain of conduct in which it is
more important that people act on their own judgment, i.e. that they conform to
their conscientiously held but possibly mistaken moral convictions, than that they
defer to the law’s authority (even where doing so would enable them to better act
on the reasons that truly apply to them). That is, the right in question would
provide a basis for a justificatory defense for conscientiously motivated criminal
breaches that fell within the scope of the right to conscientious action.
Do people have an interest in freedom from the suffering concomitant with
alienation and akrasia weighty enough to ground a right, a prima facie claim at least
against the state that it refrain from exposing them to a significant risk of it by
requiring obedience to its laws whenever they conflict with a person’s conscientious
convictions? I am of two minds. On the one hand, to maintain that such a right
exists is to argue that the avoidance of personal suffering sometimes entails not only
a right to do wrong but also a right to act on what is actually a defeated reason.37
Such a claim might be rejected on the grounds that people only have a right not to
suffer unjustly, and that insofar as conscientiously motivated disobedients to law
would actually do better at acting on the reasons that apply to them by conforming
to the law than by acting on their own judgment, the suffering that will follow if they
conform to the law may be unfortunate but it is not unjust. Or at least this

Brownlee (2012: 120-1) explicitly adopts an interest theory of rights.
As in the previous section I put the point this way because Brownlee maintains that acts can be
wrong but justified all things considered; i.e. done for an undefeated reason.
36
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conclusion holds in cases where the reasons to which the agent’s conformity is
enhanced by deference to the law are moral obligations or duties. On the other
hand, if an agent’s interest in autonomy can ground a right to do wrong, it is not
obvious why the interest in not suffering the injuries Brownlee posits cannot also do
so. Brownlee holds that “the moral rights arising from moral conviction are rooted
in the principle of humanism”38 which, recall, holds that “society has a duty to honor
the fact that we are reasoning and feeling beings capable of forming deep moral
commitments.”39 Perhaps the duty to honor people as feeling beings indicates that
people’s interest in not experiencing the phenomenological suffering characteristic
of alienation and akrasia is weighty enough to provide an independent ground for a
moral right to conscientious action that can underpin a justificatory defense for
certain criminal breaches. In practice resolving this dispute may well prove
unnecessary, since it seems likely that any case where the law imposes on a civil
disobedient a significant risk of experiencing the phenomenological suffering that
typically accompanies alienation and akrasia will also be one in which it threatens
her full realization of personal autonomy. Moreover, even if the phenomenological
suffering likely to accompany fidelity to law at the expense of loyalty to deeply held
moral convictions does not provide a justificatory legal defense for an agent’s
criminal breach it may still legally excuse it, warrant a lesser punishment, or provide
a reason for the state to treat her mercifully.40
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Reflection on the nature of (legal) excuses further supports the claim that the
considerations Brownlee adumbrates actually support a demands-of-conviction
justificatory defense. The gist of an excuse, recall, is a person’s claim to have lived
up to our reasonable or justifiable expectations of her as a rational agent,
expectations regarding her attentiveness to reasons and her integration of them into
her practical reasoning. To offer an excuse for one’s unjustified conduct is to argue
that one ought not to be held responsible for shortcomings in these respects. If true,
this claim explains why one’s act, though wrong, does not reflect poorly on one.
Given the nature of excusatory arguments, and her desire to defend a demands-ofconscience excuse, Brownlee ought to explain how it is that a conscientiously
motivated law-breaker’s moral commitments interfere with her responsiveness to
the reasons that apply to her, and why, as a concession to human imperfection and
frailty, the state ought not to hold her responsible for her defective practical
reasoning. She does nothing of the sort, however. Instead, Brownlee appeals to the
value of autonomy and freedom from psychological injuries such as alienation and
akrasia as reasons for the law to honor and respect its subjects by acknowledging a
demands-of-conviction defense. But as I have now argued at length, the claim that
people have an interest in autonomy (and perhaps also in psychological well-being)
sufficiently weighty or valuable to ground a prima facie duty on the state not
condemn them for their conscientiously motivated communicative acts of
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disobedience to law grounds a legal justification for criminal conduct, not an
excuse.41
Brownlee herself recognizes the justificatory overtones in her argument for a
demands-of -conviction defense. The value the conscientiously motivated offender
seeks to protect, she writes, “include the genuine value of her autonomy, agency,
and capacity for persistent commitments, which together may seem to lend a
justificatory gloss to what would otherwise have to be an assertion of mere
excusability.”42 Of course, a successful argument for a demands-of-conviction
defense grounded in respect for the conscientious law-breaker’s autonomy must
grapple with how to construe its value in cases where an actor chooses to act
wrongly. But Brownlee briefly describes several plausible answers to this challenge,
including treating autonomy as non-instrumentally but conditionally valuable, with
the condition being that an agent choose well, or less demandingly, that she not
violate others’ moral rights. Why, then, does she not argue for a demands-ofconviction justificatory defense, or perhaps more accurately, recognize that this is
the conclusion her argument warrants? Perhaps it is because she believes that only
those who can show that their act was justified all things considered can claim a

The passages in which Brownlee argues for a demands-of-conviction defense include only a single
remark that connects her discussion of the nature of excuses with her claim that, all else equal,
conscientiously motivated law-breakers ought to be legally excused for their communicative acts of
disobedience to law. In characterizing their disobedience to law as an “autonomous act taken on the
strength of their [conscientious] commitments,” Brownlee writes, such actors can give reasons for
mistakenly believing that they had undefeated reasons to act as they did. But it does not follow that
in doing so these actors must be offering an excuse for their criminal conduct, as Brownlee suggests.
Rather, they may wish to demonstrate their conscientious motive because doing so is necessary to
establish that they acted within their right to conscientious action, and so necessary to establishing
that they were justified in not treating the particular law they violated as authoritative.
41
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justificatory legal defense, and she wishes to argue that conscientiously motivated
disobedients to law are entitled to a legal defense even in some range of cases in
which their conduct is not justified all things considered. As I argued in the previous
section, the first of these two claims is mistaken. Still, it does offer an explanation
for the surprising fact that Brownlee elects to argue only for an excusatory defense
on behalf of conscientiously motivated disobedients to law.
IV
The justificatory defense for which I maintain Brownlee actually argues
extends only to those acts that fall within the scope of an agent’s right to
conscientious action. What, then, of conscientiously motivated acts of disobedience
to law outside the scope of that right, or at least ones the state judges to be outside
the scope of that right? Might at least some of those who perform such acts be
legally excused for doing so? I think the answer is yes, though at least in a
moderately just legal system examples may be few and far between even before we
take into account limits on the recognition of a legal excuse grounded in
considerations other than the agent’s desert. The more common case will likely be
one in which the actor who performs a conscientiously motivated communicative
breach of the criminal law can offer a partial excuse for her actions, one the law
ought to treat as presumptive grounds for a mitigated sentence (or, if possible,
conviction for a lesser offense).
An agent’s conscientiously held conviction can excuse her criminal conduct
only if it causes the defect in practical reasoning that leads her to mistakenly
conclude that she has an undefeated reason to perform a token of some criminally
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proscribed act type. Jeremy Horder offers one such example in his discussion of
what he calls a demands-of-conscience excuse, namely an assisted suicide “mercy
killing” performed as a result of “conscience-driven emotional difficulties.”43 The
“emotional pressure” to which the defendant is subject prevents her from
recognizing or responding appropriately to the law’s proscription of such acts as a
reason that defeats her victim’s repeated request for assistance in taking his life. As
Horder describes the case, defendant and victim have been married for fifty years
(in virtue of which I take it he means to imply that they have special associative
duties to one another), they have an intimate and detailed knowledge of the
suffering experienced by those with victim’s incurable disease, and each has
promised to assist the other in committing suicide should either ever suffer from the
disease in question.44 Moreover, in pressing her to assist him in ending his life, the
victim implicitly consents to her doing so. In short, defendant has a host of reasons
to assist her spouse in taking his own life, all of which we may assume he has
repeatedly called to her attention. Suppose, however, that all of these reasons are
excluded by the law’s prohibition on intentionally killing (innocent) people. Assume
that defendant has a reason (indeed a duty) not to kill morally innocent people, one
that defeats her reason (perhaps also a duty) to lessen her loved one’s suffering and
that renders null the putative promissory obligation at issue. She will better
conform to the reasons that apply to her in this case by deferring to the law rather
than acting on her own judgment, colored as it is by her emotional response to her
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spouse’s plight. Nevertheless, I believe it is at least arguable that the fortitude to
reason well in these circumstances exceeds what we may reasonably expect of the
defendant. That is, we may not justifiably demand that, when deliberating about
whether to assist her dying spouse in committing suicide, she recognize and
respond to the reason the law gives her not to act on the reasons that her dying
spouse repeatedly brings to her attention. If so, then defendant has a prima facie
claim to be fully excused for committing the crime of assisting another in taking his
own life.45
Brownlee notes that concrete examples invite nothing but controversy, and
no doubt that is true of the foregoing case. Furthermore, though the defendant’s
deeply held commitments may account for her failure to respond appropriately to
the law, her act is not a communicative one since it is not done “either in order to
engage others or because the act will engage others in deliberation about the merits
of the cause.”46 But that is all the more reason to construe the act as (at best)
excusable, and perhaps by contrast lend credence to the claim that we ought to
construe communicative acts of disobedience to law that fall within the scope of the
right to conscientious action as legally justified. In fact, the suggestion that only
conscientiously motivated communicative disobedience to law can qualify for a
justificatory legal defense, while only conscientiously motivated non-communicative
disobedience to law can qualify for an excuse, sheds new light on the dispute

Horder only claims that the defendant is entitled to a partial excuse because he thinks only minor
violations of individual rights can be fully excused.
46 Bronwlee (2012: 160). The story might be constructed so as to make defendant’s criminal conduct
evasive or non-evasive.
45
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between Horder and Brownlee regarding the extension of a demands-of-conviction
defense to civil disobedience. The primary point of disagreement between them
concerns the possibility of reconciling a moral right to civil disobedience with
legitimate democratic authority. Brownlee offers a compelling rebuttal to those like
Horder and Raz who argue that no such reconciliation is possible.47 The success of
her argument entails that civil disobedients have a prima facie claim against the
state that it neither convict nor punish them for criminal conduct that falls within
their right to civil disobedience. Horder errs, that is, in arguing that a just legal
order ought not to extend a criminal defense to civil disobedients.48 However,
Horder also identifies a second reason not to extend a demands-of-conscience
excuse to civil disobedients, namely that they violate the law deliberately and with a
political aim, i.e. for the purpose of challenging some law or policy. Brownlee
focuses on the latter of these two features, which she refers to as the strategic action
problem, but I believe it is the former that explains why civil disobedience, meaning
conscientiously motivated communicative disobedience to law, does not qualify for
an excuse. As Horder puts the point, “by way of contrast [to a civil disobedient], if D
is to be excused on a demands-of-conscience basis, his or her engagement in the
law-breaking religious practice must have more or less spontaneously reflected, in
terms of reasons for action, solely and simply a sense of moral obligation.”49 Both
the spontaneity of a conscientiously motivated actor’s violation of the law and her
lack of any communicative intent cohere with, and provide evidence for, its arising
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out of a defect in the actor’s practical reasoning caused by the emotional pressure to
which she was subject. Where that pressure was such that it would not be
reasonable or justifiable to expect her not to make the error in practical reasoning
that she did, the conditions for a complete excuse are met. Thus it is the nature of
excuses that rules out their application to civil disobedience, not the incompatibility
of civil disobedience and legitimate democratic authority. In short, while Horder
correctly maintains that that a just legal system ought not to excuse acts of civil
disobedience, Brownlee argues correctly that those who perform them are entitled
to a demands-of-conviction defense (albeit not the type of defense for which she
claims to be arguing).
The foregoing argument may give rise to two confusions I wish to dispel.
First, I do not claim that spontaneous disobedience to law must be noncommunicative; after all, many historically important acts of civil disobedience
began with people spontaneously protesting unjust laws or policies (and, for that
matter, entire regimes). Rather, I contend only that when it is excusable
conscientiously motivated disobedience to law will be spontaneous and noncommunicative because those properties characterize conduct that can be explained
in the manner necessary to provide an agent with an excuse for so acting. Second, I
have not argued that in a just legal system no one who might be colloquially
described as a civil disobedient could ever have a claim to be legally excused for her
criminal conduct. All else equal it may be that a just legal system ought to extend an
excusatory legal defense to those conscientiously motivated disobedients to law
who fail in their attempt to perform civil disobedience (as Brownlee describes it)
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because of the emotional pressure under which they act. An actor who violated one
or more of Brownlee’s process related constraints on what counts as civil
disobedience might defend herself in a court of law as follows: though she
committed a criminal breach without a legal justification, her anger and frustration
over the injustice of a given policy and the apathy of political leaders and her fellow
citizens in the face of that injustice caused her to mistakenly conclude that her
conduct, though illegal, was (legally) justifiable. I went too far, she might say, an apt
description insofar as it implies that she would have enjoyed a justificatory legal
defense had she committed certain other criminal breaches in order to oppose the
policy in question. We need not worry here about whether (all else equal) legal
officials ought to grant such an actor a complete excuse, i.e. an excusatory defense,
or at most a partial excuse that calls for conviction on a lesser offense and/or a
reduction in sentence. The point I wish to emphasize is simply that the conceptual
argument against excusing acts of civil disobedience set out in the previous
paragraph does not rule out the possibility of excusing those conscientiously
motivated actors who attempt unsuccessfully to perform communicative acts of
disobedience to law.
Brownlee, too, notes that conscientiously motivated law-breakers who
cannot avail themselves of a demands-of-conviction defense may nevertheless wish
to call the state’s attention to, in her words, the onerousness for them of abiding by
the law. “[E]ven when their acts are not fully exculpable, civil disobedience is
disobedience grounded in deeply and conscientiously held commitments that
understandably make it difficult for disobedients both to follow laws that
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contravene those commitments and to refrain from communicating in effective
ways their objections to those laws” (Brownlee, 235). Their reason for doing so,
Brownlee argues, is that it provides the state with a reason to treat them mercifully,
to mitigate its punishment not as a matter of respect for them as responsible agents
but out of concern for them as sentient creatures who are suffering. Perhaps it does,
though a court’s attempt to respond to criminal offenders as victims risks both
interfering with its primary duty to respond to them as perpetrators (i.e. as
responsible agents) and muddying the public’s perception of its condemnation of
their illegal conduct. More importantly, it is arguable that we ought to distinguish as
best we can between a person’s conscientiously held commitments making it so
difficult for her to respond properly to the law that she qualifies for at least a partial
excuse for her criminal conduct, and cases where the onerousness of conforming to
the law does not rise to that level. In the former case the civil disobedient warrants
a lesser punishment as a matter of justice, while in the latter case she may only
plead for mercy.
*

*

*

The fact that I have gone on at length regarding what I believe to be errors in
Brownlee’s account of a demands-of-conviction defense should not be taken as a
reason to spend one’s time reading other texts. Indeed, quite the contrary;
Conscience and Conviction is a thought-provoking work full of insights not only on
the topics discussed in this paper but on practical reasoning, moral pluralism, and
just punishment as well. Perhaps the book’s most outstanding feature is the moral
sensitivity Brownlee displays throughout; this book does not merely contain an
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account of conscience, it exemplifies the exercise of one. Anyone who chooses to
engage with Brownlee’s book will be well rewarded for his or her decision to do so.
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